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Abstract—Secure sum computation of private data inputs is an interesting example of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) which has at-
tracted many researchers to devise secure protocols with lower probability of data leakage. In this paper, we provide a novel protocol to com-
pute the sum of individual data inputs with zero probability of data leakage when two neighbor parties collude to know the data of a middle 
party. We break the data block of each party into number of segments and redistribute the segments among parties before the computation. 
These entire steps create a scenario in which it becomes impossible for semi  honest parties to know the private data of some other party. 
 
Index Terms— Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC), Privacy, Semi honest parties, k-Secure Sum Protocol, Information Security, Trusted 
Third Party (TTP). 
 
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
 Due to the tremendous growth of the Internet and huge 
amount of online transactions taking place over it, opportuni-
ties exist for joint computations requiring privacy of the in-
puts. These computations occur between parties which may 
or may not have trust in one another. In literature, this subject 
of information security is called Secure Multiparty Computa-
tion (SMC). This type of computation is aimed at privacy of 
individual inputs and the correctness of the result. Formally, 
in SMC the parties  P1,   P2, …,  Pk  want to compute some 
common function   f(x1, x2,…, xk ) of inputs x1, x2,…, xk such 
that a party  Pi  can know only its own input xi  and the value 
of the function f . The SMC problems use two computation 
paradigms; ideal model and real model paradigm. In ideal 
model there exists a Trusted Third Party (TTP) which accepts 
inputs from all the parties, evaluates the common function 
and sends result of the computation to the parties. If the TTP is 
honest, then the parties can know the result only. In real mod-
el, there is no third party, instead all the parties agree on some 
protocol which allows them to evaluate the function while 
preserving privacy of individual inputs. Consider an example 
of SMC where two banks cooperatively want to know details 
about some suspicious customer but no bank is willing to 
disclose the details of the customer to other bank or even the 
result of the query. In such situations the SMC solutions are of 
great significance. A simple and easily understood example of 
SMC is the secure sum computation where all the parties 
want to know the sum of their individual data inputs preserv-
ing the privacy of inputs [10]. The secure sum protocol pro-
posed by Clifton et al. [10] used randomization method for 
computing the sum. Parties were arranged in a unidirectional 
ring. One of the parties is selected as a protocol initiator party 
which starts the computation by selecting a random number 
and adds its own data. The sum is then transmitted to the next 
party. The next party simply adds the data to the received 
sum and then sends this new sum to the next party. This pro-
cedure is repeated until the protocol initiator receives the sum 
of all the data and the random number. Since the random 
number is known only to the protocol initiator party, it sub-
tracts the random number from the sum and announces the 
result to all the parties. The architecture of secure sum proto-
col is depicted in fig. 1 where parties P0, P1, P2 and P3 perform 
secure sum computation over their data 10, 8, 7 and 15. The 
protocol initiator party P0 selects a random number R = 5 and 
sends the sum of this random number and its private data to 
P1. This sum (15) is added with the data of P1 to get the new 
sum 23 which is sent to P2. This process is repeated until the 
sum 45 is received by P0. Now, since the random number is 
only known to P0 it simply subtracts this random number 
from 45 and broadcasts the final sum as 40 to all the parties. 
This protocol works well when all the parties are honest in the 
sense they follow each step agreed in the protocol and never 
try to know other information except the result of the compu-
tation.  In this protocol, two adjacent parties to a middle party 
can cooperate maliciously to know the data of a middle party. 
We proposed novel protocols in [11, 15, 16] where the proba-
bility of data leakage has been reduced by breaking the data 
block into a fixed number of segments.  
 
In this paper, we propose a secure sum computation pro-
tocol with zero probability of data leakage when two adjacent 
parties to a middle party collude to hack the data of a middle 
party. Each data block is broken into k segments where k is 
equal to the number of parties. Then the segments are distri-
buted to other parties before computation. This protocol we 
call as dk-Secure Sum Protocol. 
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Fig. 1: Secure Sum Protocol [10]. 
 
2 BACKGROUND 
The concept of SMC began in 1982 when Yao proposed 
and gave solution to his millionaire’s problem in which two 
millionaires wanted to know who was richer without disclos-
ing individual wealth to each other [1]. It was a two-party 
computation protocol for semi honest parties who follows the 
protocol but also tries to know something other than the re-
sult. The idea was extended to multiparty computation by 
many researchers [2]. They used circuit evaluation protocols 
for secure computation. Earlier research focused on theoretical 
studies. Later, some real life applications emerged like Private 
Information Retrieval (PIR) [3, 4], Privacy-preserving data 
mining [5, 6], Privacy-preserving geometric computation [7], 
Privacy-preserving scientific computation [8], Privacy-
preserving statistical analysis [9] etc. A detailed review of 
SMC research is provided by Du et al. in [12] where they de-
veloped a framework for problem discovery and converting 
normal problem to SMC problem. A review of  SMC with 
special focus on telecommunication systems is given by 
Oleshchuk et al. in [13]. Anonymity enabled SMC was pro-
posed by Mishra et al. in [14] where the identities of the par-
ties are made ambiguous for achieving privacy. 
Our proposed protocol is motivated by the work of Clif-
ton et al. [10] where they proposed a toolkit of components for 
solution to SMC problems. One of the components of this 
toolkit is the secure sum computation. This component is used 
in many distributed data mining applications where many 
physically distributed sites compute sum of values from indi-
vidual sites. The secure sum protocol proposed in [10] used 
random numbers for privacy of individual data inputs. The 
weakness of this scheme is that any two parties Pi-1 and Pi+1  
can cooperate to know the secret data of party Pi by perform-
ing only one computation. We proposed k-Secure Sum Proto-
col and Extended k-Secure Sum Protocol in [11] where we sig-
nificantly reduced the probability of data leakage by breaking 
the data block of individual party in number of segments. The 
probability of data leakage decreases as we increase the num-
ber of segments in a data block.  
We proposed novel protocols for reducing probability of 
data leakage to zero by changing the positions of the parties in 
the ring [15, 16]. 
 
3 PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE AND PROTOCOL 
DESCRIPTION 
Figure 2 shows the proposed protocol architecture for dk-
Secure Sum Protocol before redistribution of segments. Coope-
rating parties P1,   P2 ,  …,  Pk  are arranged in a ring for compu-
tation purpose. Each party itself breaks the data block into k 
segments. There also exist distribution paths for distributing 
the data segments to other parties before computation. The 
computation path is shown with a solid line but the distribu-
tion path is shown with the dashed line. The communication 
lines between parties are assumed to be secure.  
 
Fig 2: Architecture of dk-Secure Sum Protocol before 
redistribution. 
 
Fig 3: Snapshot of  dk-Secure Sum Protocol after redi-
stribution. 
 
Fig. 4: Snapshot of dk-Secure Sum Protocol for first 
round of segment computation 
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3.1 Informal Description of dk-Secure Sum 
Protocol 
Assume, P1,   P2 , …,  Pk  are k parties involved in cooperative 
secure sum computation where each party is capable of break-
ing its data block into a fixed number of segments such that 
the sum of all the segments is equal to the value of the data 
block of that party. In proposed protocol number of segments 
in a data block is kept equal to the number of parties. The val-
ues of the segments are randomly selected by the party and it 
a secret of the party. If k be the number of segments (which is 
same as the number of parties) then in this scheme each party 
holds any one segment with it and k-1 segments are sent to k-1 
parties, one to each of the parties. Thus at the end of this redi-
stribution each of  the parties holds k segments in which only 
one segment belongs to the party and other segments belong 
to remaining parties, one from each. A snapshot of four party 
secure sum computations after distribution of segments is 
shown in fig 3. Now, k-Secure Sum Protocol [11] can be applied 
to get the sum of all the segments. In this protocol, one of the 
parties is unanimously selected as the protocol initiator party 
which starts the computation by sending the data segment to 
the next party in the ring. The receiving party adds its data 
segment to the received partial sum and transmits its result to 
the next party in the ring. This process is repeated until all the 
segments of all the parties are added and the sum is an-
nounced by the protocol initiator party. Snapshot of dk-Secure 
Sum Protocol for first round of segment computation is shown 
in the fig 4. 
Now even if two adjacent parties maliciously cooperate 
to know the data of a middle party they will be able to know 
only those k segments of a party which belong to every party. 
The sum of these segments is a garbage value and thus worth-
less for the hacker party. 
 
3.2 Formal Description of dk-Secure Sum Protocol 
Our protocol is based on the architecture shown in fig 2 
and fig 3. There are k parties P1,   P2 ,…,  Pk  involved in coop-
erative secure sum computation. Each party Pi has its secret 
input xi  and all the parties are interested to know the sum       
∑ xi   for i = 1 to k.  
 
Algorithm:  dk-Secure Sum  
1. Define P1,   P2 , …,  Pk  as  k parties. 
2. Assume these parties have secret inputs     x1,  x2,…, xk. 
3. Each party   Pi   breaks its data    xi  into k segments di1 , di2 
,…, dik  such that ∑ dij = xi  for j =1 to k. 
4. Each party keeps any one segment with it and distributes  
k-1 segments to other parties such that one segment is dis-
tributed to one party. 
5. Each party reshuffles the received segments randomly. 
6. Assume rc =k and Sij = 0,   
/* Sij  is partial sum and rc is round counter */ 
7. while rc!=0  
         begin  
         for  j = 0 to k-1 
                for i = 0 to k-1 
      Pi  sends Sij  = dij + Sij  to  P (i+1) mod k   
                 rc = rc – 1 
                 end 
8. The protocol initiator party broadcasts sum Sij  to all the 
parties. 
9. End of algorithm. 
 
3.3 Performance Analysis of dk-Secure Sum 
Protocol 
The dk-Secure Sum Protocol performs satisfactorily due to 
many reasons. The segmentation of the data block of a party is 
done by the party in its own way. Secondly, the party ran-
domly selects any one of the segments and keeps with it. Re-
maining segments are distributed to other parties randomly. 
At the end of such a distribution each party holds equal num-
ber of segments. Each party holds one segment of its own and 
one segment from each of the parties. Now, if Pi+1 and Pi-1     
collude to know xi which is the secret of Pi then they will be 
able to know only these segments. The sum of these segments 
is garbage for the colluding parties. The protocol may not 
work correctly for three parties because if any two parties 
become corrupt then two segments directly received from the 
third party can be shared and the third segment can be at-
tacked during computation. But as the number of segments 
increases beyond three then other segments become ambi-
guous for the corrupt parties as there is know way to know all 
the segments of a middle party. Thus the probability of data 
leakage for four or more parties is zero when majority of par-
ties are honest. This is an appreciable improvement over pre-
vious protocols [11] where the probability of data leakage by 
two colluding parties was P1k = (2/n-1)k  where k  is the num-
ber of segments and  n is the number of parties. 
Now, to calculate the communication complexity of the        
dk-Secure algorithm, we know that each party distributes k-1 
segments to other parties. Therefore k (k-1) communications 
are done during distribution. During computation each party 
sends partial sum of the segments to other party in the ring. 
Thus in each round of computation k communications are 
done. For k such rounds k2 communications are done. There-
fore total number of communications is given in (1). 
 
C(k)=k (k-1) + k2   
C(k)=2k2 – k                                                                                           (1)  
Now for getting the computation complexity S(k) we see that 
in each round k computations are done. Thus for k such 
rounds k2 computations are done which is given in (2).  
 
S(k) = k2                                                                                                 (2) 
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Fig. 5: Communication Complexity as a function of 
no. of parties in dk-Secure Sum protocol 
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Fig. 6: Computation Complexity as a function of no. 
of parties in dk-Secure Sum protocol. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 depict the communication and the computa-
tion complexity with the number of parties respectively.Thus 
we show that the communication and the computation com-
plexity both are O(k2).        
4 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE 
In this paper, we propose dk-Secure Sum Protocol for 
computation of sum of individual parties preserving privacy 
of their inputs. The protocol allows parties to break their data 
inputs into segments and distributing these segments among 
parties before computation. It provides zero probability for 
two colluding neighbors when they want to attack data of a 
middle party. This is an appreciable improvement over pre-
vious protocols available in the literature. Further efforts can 
be made to reduce the computation and the communication 
complexity preserving the property of zero hacking.  
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